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**Judicious and Prudent Access To Reserve Forces**

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**A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the  
requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations**

**The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily  
endorsed by the Naval War College or the Departments of the Navy and Army**

**Signature: \_\_\_\_\_**

**23 October 2006**

**Abstract**  
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Five years into our nation's first protracted conflict since the advent of the all volunteer force, we must reaffirm our investment in the current and projected Reserve force role. To do this, we must take a look at a few key Reserve Component (RC) policies and practices that have emerged since the start of the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Three, in particular, which warrant examination are: the method by which combatant commander requirements are generated and access to mobilize Reserve forces is granted, the effort to rebalance the force in order to reduce the strain on Reserve forces, and the judicious and prudent use of Reserve force policy. These policies must be considered to determine if they, along with the Secretary of Defense's (SECDEF's) method of providing metered access to Reserve force units and service members to meet Central Command (CENTCOM) requirements, support long term best practices when it pertains to joint operational warfare.

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## Introduction

Five years into our nation's first protracted conflict since the advent of the all volunteer force, we must reaffirm our investment in the current and projected Reserve force role. To do this, we must take a look at a few key Reserve Component<sup>1</sup> (RC) policies and practices that have emerged since the start of the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Three, in particular, which warrant examination are: the method by which combatant commander requirements are generated and access to mobilize Reserve forces is granted, the effort to rebalance the force in order to reduce the strain on Reserve forces, and the judicious and prudent use of Reserve forces policy. These policies must be considered to determine if they, along with the Secretary of Defense's (SECDEF's) method of providing metered access to Reserve force units and service members to meet Central Command (CENTCOM) requirements, support long term best practices when it pertains to joint operational warfare.

Our nation's ability to wage war on terror and to carry out CENTCOM operations in Afghanistan and Iraq would not be possible were it not for the contribution of our seven Reserve Components. These Reserve Force contributions in support of the war have averaged 115,000 reserve service member mobilizations a year<sup>2</sup> since the start of the GWOT. This contribution represents the largest sustained reliance on Reserve Force manpower in the history of the all volunteer force (July 1973 to present) and since Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird (August 21, 1970) directed the Services to reduce overall end strength of active forces and increase reliance on the guard and reserves<sup>3</sup>. Since then, our Active and Reserve military forces have continued to get smaller, and our reliance on an RC contribution that is

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<sup>1</sup> The term Reserve Component refers to both Reserve and National Guard

<sup>2</sup> OSD RA Daily Slide " Reserve Components: Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom

<sup>3</sup> Citizen Warriors America's National Guard and Reserve Forces & The Politics of National Security, Stephen M. Duncan p 106

mobilized to active duty has continued to rise. This reliance has taken what was once a strategic military capability held in reserve and thrust it into an operational role that is now an essential element of any military campaign.

It is not likely that our reliance on activated Reserve force manpower will change in the near future. New paradigms of service to leverage alternate manpower sources and a continued emphasis on the use of volunteer RC members may reduce the annual number of involuntary activations (mobilizations) but they won't change our national reliance on an activated RC contribution in order to hold down active end strength and meet our operational requirements. It is also unlikely that our nation will continue to support a half trillion dollar annual defense budget. More than likely we will move toward a peace dividend, continue to look at smaller active forces, and keep the fundamental elements of the total force policy. This means the RC expectation will remain that of an operational force contributing to meet combatant commander requirements and will not return to the Cold War expectation of a strategic reserve employed as such.

Today, RC Forces comprise 45% of the total force<sup>4</sup>, with the Reserve of the Army comprising 53% of its force<sup>5</sup>. Figure 1<sup>6</sup> illustrates in man years the Army's drawdown of forces between 1988 and 2004 and their increased reliance on a Reserve force contribution. It also depicts the increased duration of involuntary activations to meet combatant commander requirements. Since 1990, the Army has not gone a single year without mobilizing a portion of its Reserve forces to meet manpower requirements.

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<sup>4</sup> OASD Reserve Affairs Information Brief (RA 101) March 13, 2006, slide 27

<sup>5</sup> Ibid, slide 14

<sup>6</sup> Extracted from data used to create slide 24, OASD Reserve Affairs Information Brief (RA 101) March 13, 2006

# RC Manpower and OPTEMPO




Figure 1

To fully appreciate the 21<sup>st</sup> Century operational RC paradigm, an understanding of how we evolved as a nation to rely on RC forces, how we access RC forces, the judicious and prudent use of Reserve Forces policy and the efforts to rebalance, in order to transform our reliance on RC forces, is required. Understanding the complexity of these practices and policies will generate suggestions on how we, as a nation, can enhance the RC role in the future.

## The Evolution of the RC Contribution

The evolution of our reliance on RC capabilities begins with the Abram's Doctrine. General Creighton Abrams, the Army's Chief of Staff (October 1972 – September 1974), put forward the notion that to win the hearts and minds of the American people and to ensure they support future conflicts, the Army would no longer fight without the participation of its

Reserves. Abrams' doctrine and Secretary of Defense Laird's (August 21, 1970) cost saving directive set into motion a 20 year transformation of the expected Reserve force role. This transformation was tested, with great success, although briefly, in the first Gulf War (1990-1992). Throughout the 1990's our reliance on an activated RC contribution continued.

Figure 1 depicts, from an Army perspective, how it augmented Active Component (AC) end strength by using multiple force rotations of RC on active duty, into and out of a theater of operation, for increasingly longer periods of time between from 1990 to 2004. The performance of the RC in support of each exercise, during this time period, reinforced our expectations and solidified political willingness to rely on a Reserve Force contribution. The successful reliance and employment of the RC contribution throughout the 90's created a political and military climate that was comfortable with the emerging Reserve identity. RC successes throughout the 1990's validated both Abrams' and Laird's 1970's vision to increase reliance on activated RC manpower. During the 1990's the US military enjoyed access to the RC forces, a balanced expectation of their contribution.

The two basic scenarios that tested political will throughout the 90's did not challenge today's increased reliance on Reserve forces. To support the first Gulf War we activated a large number of Reserve forces for an average period of 156 days. Between Desert Shield and Desert Storm (DS/DS) and the GWOT, the Army activated fewer Reserves Soldiers but increased their length of service on active duty to greater than 200 days on average. In both cases, there was sufficient lead time for combatant commands, the Joint Staff and the Army to identify requirements, match forces, and then train, and deploy the Reserve force to meet the requirement. Today the Army's Reserve force contribution to the GWOT is an open ended response that requires up to 18 months away from home.



## Access to RC forces

To call our RC forces to active duty in support of military operations we need a requirement and an access authority. Requirements are generated collaboratively by the Services, and by the Combatant Commanders. These requirements are then validated by the Joint Staff. When a need to activate RC forces is generated, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs request the President or Congress to provide an RC activation authority to support the validated requirements. This authority not only supports activations at the onset of an operation, it supports, within legal limits, the rotational cycle of the requirements generation process. Figure 2<sup>7</sup> below explains briefly the current set of laws contained within Title 10 of United States Code that offers activation options ranging from one day to the duration of a conflict plus 6 months. The President and/or Congress will choose the appropriate access level needed to support the emerging or ongoing operation.

### ***TITLE 10 USC Mobilization Statutes***

<b>12301(d)</b> <i>RC Volunteers</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Requires consent of individual RC member</li> <li>• Governors must consent to Guard activation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• All Reservists</li> <li>• No number limitation stated</li> <li>• No duration stated</li> </ul>
<b>12301(b)</b> <i>15-day Statute</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Service Secretaries may call Ready Reserve up to 15 days/year</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Annual Training</li> <li>• Operational Missions</li> <li>• Involuntary</li> </ul>
<b>12304</b> <i>Presidential Reserve Call-up</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Requires Presidential signature</li> <li>• Notification of Congress</li> <li>• No Congressional Action Required</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Selected Reserve, with up to 30,000 IRR</li> <li>• Not more than 200,000</li> <li>• Not more than 270 days</li> <li>• Not for domestic emergencies except WMD</li> </ul>
<b>12302</b> <i>Partial Mobilization</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Requires Declaration of National Emergency</li> <li>• Report to Congress Every 6 Months</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ready Reserve</li> <li>• Not More 1,000,000</li> <li>• Not more than 2 years</li> </ul>
<b>12301(a)</b> <i>Full Mobilization</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Requires declaration of War or National Emergency by the Congress</li> <li>• Requires Congress to be in session</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• All Reservists including members in an inactive status and retired members</li> <li>• No number limitation</li> <li>• Duration of War or emergency plus 6 months</li> </ul>

Figure 2

<sup>7</sup> Slide 7, OASD Reserve Affairs Briefing on Mobilization of Reserve Component Forces In Support of the Global War on Terror

Figure 3<sup>8</sup> depicts the process used to generate the authority to activate RC forces, without the consent of the Service member, to meet combatant commander requirements.




Figure 3

The common practice prior to the Global War on Terror (GWOT) was for the President to provide the Secretary of Defense access to involuntarily activate RC forces. The SECDEF would then delegate a portion of that authority to the Secretaries of the Military Departments who would use it to activate RC members, without their consent, in order to meet validated requirements. The delegation from the SECDEF to the Secretaries of the Military Departments is more commonly referred to as the Service MOBCAP (mobilization cap).

Delegations of authority prior to the GWOT empowered Service Secretaries to activate their Reserves in accordance with published policies. It provided the Services with the autonomy to activate, as they saw fit, their RC units to support requirements. Within this

<sup>8</sup> Slide 8, OASD Reserve Affairs Briefing on Mobilization of Reserve Component Forces In Support of the Global War on Terror

authority was the ability to activate RC units not only to meet the Regional Combatant Command requirements, but also to provide the internal service support needed to train and deploy RC forces and to backfill peacetime functions of Active members who deploy in support of the operation. The oversight trigger prior to the GWOT was the MOBCAP. So long as the Services operated below their delegated number of authorized activations, they did not have to seek permission from the SECDEF to use RC forces on active duty. The GWOT activation process has evolved through the implementation of the policies on judicious and prudent use of Reserve forces to a SECDEF metered approach to access that is employed in conjunction with the practice of delegating authority or MOBCAP.

Figure 4<sup>9</sup> shows the linear method from generation of a requirement and delivery of a capability to CENTCOM in conjunction with mobilization which is the final process required to provide the RC force. This is an operational process that, depending on the type of unit, takes 146 to 244 days (5 to 8 months) to result in an RC service member or unit arriving in theater to perform the mission sourced to support the validated requirement. Since the start of the war, the process from generation of a requirement to the approval of the requirement has become faster by almost 30 days, despite the addition of a SECDEF or USD P&R approval to involuntarily activate RC members before the Secretaries of the Military Departments can order that member to active duty. You would think that reducing the time it takes to approve the mobilization of a Reserve member would mean the overall process would be faster, it is not; it has become slower. As a result of measures taken to ensure judicious and prudent use, and to limit remobilizing RC members, the overall process from

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<sup>9</sup> OASD Reserve Affairs January 15, 2004 Rebalancing Forces, Easing the Stress on the Guard and Reserves and slide 10 Force Management 101, ARCENT / CFLCC C3-Plans

requirements generation to arrival in theater takes longer to complete with each passing GWOT rotation.




Figure 4

The processes, briefly explained above, are long and arduous endeavors which in some way, shape, or form, repeat themselves in conjunction with the rotational tempo that each Service employs to meet and sustain requirements. This process was slow and unresponsive at the start of the war and it remains slow and unresponsive today. It has, however, effectively supported the activation of almost 600,000 RC members over the last 5 years.

Among the many efforts to improve the delivery of RC capabilities to the fight are two which were directed by the Secretary of Defense in his July 9, 2003 memo on Rebalancing Forces: they are rebalancing to ease the strain on Reserve forces and judicious and prudent use of RC forces serving, without their consent, on active duty. Both have made

positive contributions by way of pacing manpower capabilities in the protracted GWOT. Both policies demonstrate a long term need for an overarching national manpower strategy. They have created short term gains, applied to meet immediate manpower needs, but not created a Reserve force that is flexible, agile, and responsive to CENTCOM requirements in support of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

### **Rebalancing the force**

The SECDEF's July 9, 2003<sup>10</sup> memo which directed a rebalancing of forces to relieve stress on Reserve forces asked the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Under Secretaries to accomplish 3 principal objectives in order to balance capabilities and promote judicious and prudent use. They were:

- Structure Guard and Reserve forces to reduce the need for involuntary mobilizations of them in particular to eliminate the need for any involuntary mobilization within the first 15 days of a rapid response or any alert prior to the start of an operation. Structure forces to limit involuntary mobilization to one every 6 years.<sup>11</sup>
- "Establish a more rigorous process for reviewing joint requirements, which ensures force structure, is designed appropriately and which validates request for forces in time to provide timely notice of mobilization."<sup>12</sup>
- Make mobilization process more efficient...<sup>13</sup>

Our force structure at the start of the war was not aligned with their expected contribution to the GWOT. All services have made changes in their active and reserve component mix to balance capabilities and improve the sustainability of their contribution to the GWOT. The Army's structure was particularly out of balance. The Army could not support Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) or Iraqi Freedom (OIF) without relying on a Reserve force contribution. To execute OIF the Army had to alert thousands of Soldiers in

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<sup>10</sup> Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense, Rebalancing Forces, July 9, 2003

<sup>11</sup> Ibid

<sup>12</sup> Ibid

<sup>13</sup> Ibid

advance of D day. Doing this hindered efforts by other elements of power to persuade Saddam Hussein to abide by the existing United Nations (UN) resolutions. From a practical and strategic matter, this was clearly unacceptable. To fix this problem, the SECDEF ordered rebalancing to eliminate the need to mobilize Reserve forces within the first 15 days or to alert them prior to D Day. If the Services can structure their forces to meet this directive, it will provide, in future conflicts, greater latitude for strategic planners across the spectrum of government.

The notion of structuring our forces to limit involuntary mobilizations to one year every six years may provide a manageable RC operations tempo. It may also be nothing more than a good guess at a metric that will meet the nation's expectations for their citizen service members. The one in six metric should be validated using a model that demonstrates its efficiencies in conjunction with the expected and available contributions of all manpower segments.

Based on the time line required to deliver an RC capability described in figure 4, I don't believe that we are moving closer toward eliminating the need to alert RC units prior to the start of operations. That does not mean the Services have not been busy rebalancing their forces and shifting capabilities between and within the components. It simply means that our process, even with rebalancing, has not become flexible enough to avoid an alert order before the onset of a Joint operation. Examples of the Service's efforts to rebalance their forces can be found in Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense Reserve Affairs (OASD RA) January 15, 2004 Rebalancing Forces, Easing the Stress on the Guard and Reserves which provides metrics with regards to service efforts to change their force structure between components.

The problems with the rebalancing to ease the strain on Reserve Forces are three fold. First, it was done without a deliberate process to engage the nation on what is an acceptable RC expectation. Second, the notion of one year out of every six was intended to be a structure guideline. It is, however, being applied today as a decision tool which provides access to individuals based on when an RC member was last called to duty. Third, force structure moves alone can not eliminate an involuntary RC contribution within the first 15 days or RC alerts prior to the start of an operation.

Rebalancing and moves to engage alternate manpower sources such as volunteers, contractors, host nation contributions were all necessary actions to pace the availability of manpower required to support the war on terror. The July 9, 2003, memo suggests this was necessary in order to ease the strain on Reserve forces. It was, in fact, necessary to move (at least for the Army) force structure from a Cold War construct, to one that can sustain a volunteer force in a protracted conflict. The RC aspect, as applied, has created a stove pipe. Simply seeking to ease the stress on the Reserves complicates not only the RC contribution but fails to consider the impact such an approach will have on other, equally valuable, manpower resource areas.

One year out of every six may be the right tempo for activating our Reserve Service members. The Department of Defense implemented it, however, without the consultation of Congress and without the diligence required to determine if it is acceptable to the nation. The 2005 Congressionally established commission on the future roles and expectations of National Guard and Reserve forces may indicate that it is not an acceptable tempo, or that Congress feels DoD is not collaborating with them on important national Reserve force issues. In establishing one in six on its own, OSD missed a strategic opportunity to work with

Congress to develop a manpower strategy that would have defined the nation's expectation of its Reserve members and synchronized that expectation with other manpower resource areas. Using one in six to meter access and prohibit the remobilization RC members to utilize 24 months cumulative service<sup>14</sup> has caused the Army to kluge together ad hoc units to meet CENTCOM requirements. These ad hoc units take longer to train individually and collectively. Using a force structure guideline to govern access has slowed over time the delivery of RC forces to the fight. So long as this ad hoc practice continues, the added few days it takes to have a requirement approved by the SECDEF will have little impact on a force that requires long lead time to prepare and deliver. The bottom line to one in six is this: it is a policy that never should have been set into motion without a deliberate implementation plan that addressed complex national issues as well as the potential second and third order operational effects.

### **Judicious and Prudent Use of Reserve Forces**

Earlier discussions on how our reliance on Reserve forces evolved between 1990 and the start of the GWOT highlighted a growing confidence in the RC service member and in the capabilities they provide. It defined a role that has grown over the years, in the number of days called to active duty, from an average 156 days to more than 200 days when GWOT started. The chart at figure 3 shows that length has expanded well beyond 300 days. For the Army today, most orders are issued for 545 days, 18 full months of time away from home in order to train for and complete a rotational tour of duty in support of a CENTCOM

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<sup>14</sup> Section 12302 of Title 10 US Code limits access under this partial mobilization statute to 24 consecutive months. It also requires the SECDEF to put into place measures that share the burden of mobilization. To do this the SECDEF has put into place policy that limits access to 24 cumulative months. In practice he has not allowed for Secretaries of the Military Departments re-access to RC members without an exhaustive process of proving why a member not previously mobilized could not go before calling someone a second time. He will allow an RC member to volunteer to be called involuntarily for up to 24 cumulative months of active duty service under section 12304.



requirement. This clearly defines the need to address judicious and prudent uses of our Reserve forces collectively and as individuals. Establishing judicious and prudent uses for our Reserves also challenges the need to apply an array of manpower resources and to balance those contributions to meet the overall CENTCOM needs. It shapes the RC's transition from a strategic force held as a last resort to that of an operational force. Today's Reserve force does more than augment AC end strength; it compliments it, in a deliberate manner, with defined expectations. The judicious and prudent use policy has served to pace available RC manpower. Judicious and prudent use policies have reduced RC involuntary mobilizations by 35%<sup>15</sup>. Judicious and prudent use policies aim to leverage technology, create new paradigms of service, and rely on volunteers. Judicious and prudent use is important to shaping a national strategy on the employment of manpower to wage war. It has, however, not been helpful at the operational level nor helpful to the services when used as a litmus test for approving RC mobilizations on an individual day by day or week by week basis. This level of meddling, at the point of execution, creates turmoil among operators and individual RC members. Bob Woodward's book Plan of Attack and Seymour Hirsch's April 2003 New Yorker article "Offense and Defense-The Battle between Donald Rumsfeld and the Pentagon" document problems caused by senior civilian officials meddling with the Time Phased Force Deployment Data List (TFDDL) and the process of requesting forces. These processes serve to synchronize the flow of manpower, equipment and supplies into a theater of operation. I could not find documentation that highlighted problems caused by screening requests to activate RC units by applying the elements of the judicious and prudent use

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<sup>15</sup> OASD Reserve Affairs January 15, 2004 Rebalancing Forces, Easing the Stress on the Guard and Reserves

policy. The impact, however, is clearly evident in the increasing amount of time required to deliver an RC capability to the fight.

## **Conclusion and Recommendations**

From personal experience on both the OSD and Army staffs, I believe that the metered access to RC forces administered by the SECDEF is unnecessarily burdensome to the effort of delivering RC forces to CENTCOM. This is a micro approach that long term won't create circumstances where the mobilization of a Reserve force unit or service member provides the flexible and agile RC response that we need from today's operational Reserve. However, the metered access that is not the catalyst of the problem. The problem is that we lack an overarching, all encompassing, national manpower strategy that synchronizes GWOT requirements with other concept plans that may need to be executed rapidly or deliberately. We do need a national RC strategy that balances political, national, military and individual RC expectations. Rebalancing and the creation of guidelines that define the judicious and prudent use of Reserve forces on active duty were necessary and continue to make a significant contribution to our all volunteer force's ability to sustain the manpower requirements of a long war. However, the implementation of the policies could have been done more efficiently and a stove pipe Reserve manpower strategy is not the answer.

My conclusions are not derived from opinions expressed in articles, books and papers about the relative merit of force caps and the Secretary of Defense's role in the size of the force needed to prosecute both OIF and OEF. Applying those concerns would cloud long term efforts to create a national manpower strategy. Those concerns focus too narrowly on the method by which the SECDEF chose to meet the President's intent. The bottom line to this operation and all to come is that we will always be a small military with many

requirements. Our military and national response will always be resource constrained in one manner or another.

I had originally intended to do somewhat of a comparison and contrast between using the TPFDDL as the method of getting approval for forces or the Request for Forces (RFF) method. After finishing my research, it was clear that neither method can offset the inefficiencies created by not having a national manpower strategy that addresses the needs of the current fight in conjunction with the multiple combinations of potentially emerging simultaneous joint operations. It was clear that without measures of effectiveness there is no criterion available to opine, one way or the other, on the efficiencies of either force requisition process. For the same reason, I decided not to delve into the impacts that service culture may or may not be having on the speed by which a Service can generate and deliver Reserve forces to CENTCOM. Any assessment one way or another would have no validity given the inability to measure the response against the objectives set by a national manpower strategy. What is fast? What is slow? I believe 146 – 244 days is too slow, but that is merely my intuitive guess.

To manage manpower across the spectrum of contributors more efficiently my recommendations are: Correct the mistakes that have been made over the past couple of years with respect to rebalancing and judicious and prudent use. To do this, we must change our paradigm with regards to CENTCOM requests for forces. Rather than assuming force requirements will go away or dramatically change each year, we should assume a validated requirement will remain until determined otherwise. Most, if not all, force requests should be for an indefinite period of time. This will allow planners to program follow on rotations without repeating the requirements generation process and the requirements approval process

on an annual basis. Extending the duration of requirements will create longer lead times for force generators. Longer lead times will provide greater clarity as to how to resource and focus pre-mobilization training. Longer lead times will shorten delivery time by at least the number of days it takes to generate a request for forces and get the requirement approved. This does not mean that there should not be some form of oversight or that CENTCOM should not be diligent in its effort to judiciously ask for and retain only requirements that are absolutely necessary.

We should immediately end the chaos caused by applying one force structuring guideline of year out of six as a metric to determine access. Assuming it provides the right tempo for the future, it can not be effective without a deliberate effort to set the force to that tempo. It is impossible to establish that tempo as long as the Services, particularly the Army and the Marines are forced to kluge units out of RC members who have not been previously called. I acknowledge that this creates an inequity issue for some. The greater good, however, outweighs the inconvenience of a few. To do this, we need to work with Congress and negotiate a mobilization clock reset. Resetting mobilization clocks means that in relation to the current GWOT partial mobilization authority every RC member, as of a defined date, will be placed back on the books with a fresh 24 month clock. RC members who have not been off duty for less than 12 months will have their clocks reset at the 12 month anniversary of their demobilization. This will allow services, particularly the Army, to fence their force generation rotations and measure their need to balance capabilities between the components in order to live within the one year out of six, or a 17% of the force rule. These two steps, approving open ended requirements and resetting RC clocks, will become the catalyst for the longer term effort to balance total manpower contributions across all the market segments.

My longer term recommendation is to create a national manpower strategy and task the management of that strategy to Joint Forces Command (JFCOM). Perhaps even rename JFCOM “Capabilities Command”. The ASD RA and his team’s look at force balance and judicious and prudent use of RC forces was absolutely the right thing to do. Had he not led that effort we would not have paced access, using the current authority, for as long as we have. It is, however, myopic to focus utilizing manpower judiciously and prudently on a single manpower segment. With a military that is getting smaller not bigger it is important that we judiciously use all our forces. The manpower and capability balance between AC and RC forces is vital for adaptive planning and sustaining the effort(s) but we must also understand the market potential of all manpower segments and fix responsibility for the defining and measuring the contribution of each.

The national manpower strategy will facilitate joint adaptive planning and joint operations by integrating, balancing and synchronizing eight major manpower market segments, they are: active component forces, reserve component forces (voluntary and involuntary), each federal agencies manpower contribution, coalition nations, host nation, local contractors within the joint operating area, international contractors and US contractors. To accomplish this, JFCOM or Capabilities Command would work with regional Combatant Commanders and the Joint Staff during adaptive planning to create detailed manpower estimates. Capabilities Command would then use automation tools to model manpower requirements and create overarching manpower expectations based on the likely combination of scenarios to be on going at any one time. Those models would inform leaders as to balance in numbers and capability for each segment. AC and RC balance would be determined from these estimates. The services would have less of a voice in the composition

of their force and strictly focus on manning, training and equipping the force directed by Capabilities Command. Leaders at all levels would have clear expectations of the manpower required to execute concept plans and a clear understanding of how the execution of one plan effects available manpower for other operations. From the RC perspective, the senior OSD leaders, the Regional Combatant Commanders and the Services will know how many RC members will be required to support operations on active duty in the coming year. They will know how many and for how long. Modeling will provide a hard baseline with actionable causes and effects when it comes to executing concurrent operations or curtailing some while executing others. Presented along the planning continuum, this model will eliminate surprises and misunderstood expectations. It will also drive joint interagency operations and become a catalyst for our ability to conduct synchronized national operations, rather than joint operations that have a national flavor. Abstract force sizing concepts that have been applied in the past, such as two Major Combat Operations or the 1-4-2-1 strategy, are vague. They don't fully inform, confirm and acknowledge expectations with the circumstantial fidelity that a national manpower strategy can provide. The future should grow on the work done to date regarding rebalancing forces. We must create the national manpower strategy and use it to define manpower contributions and the many expectations that impact those contributions. With a national manpower strategy the SECDEF will have greater confidence in where and when to employ RC forces. Future RC expectations will be measured in both number of RC service members, time to deliver the RC force and duration that force will serve, by rotation, on the ground. Resources will control the ebb and flow of the RC response and will be done with full consideration of how it effects other manpower segments. Until we have a national manpower strategy that coordinates expectations and provides

measures of effectiveness, we can not seriously evaluate the long term value of the current requirements generation process or the SECDEF's method of providing metered access to Reserve force units and service members to meet CENTCOM requirements.

Today, the requirements generation process, based on having supported almost 600K<sup>16</sup> mobilizations in support of the GWOT, has to be considered effective in relation to using RC forces to meet CENTCOM requirements. With a national manpower strategy we will be able to determine if we need to change the current requirements generation and delivery processes or depart from them in order to provide methods that are both effective and efficient. A national manpower strategy will codify national expectations which will provide measures of effectiveness by which commanders senior leaders and staffs can evaluate efficiency.

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<sup>16</sup> OSD RA 19 October 2006, Daily Slide “ Reserve Components: Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom

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